Amina Abdelkhayer, Hussain Alhowaidi, Tom Hickey, Gregory Kobzar, Inna Rodina

 

Abstract

What could be done to encourage the Middle Eastern states to move forward in creating a nuclear-testing-free zone in the region? What are the challenges the international community faces in this regard? The current research paper analyses both internal and external factors influencing the position of the five Middle Eastern states – Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria – which have not signed/ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Case studies facilitate the understanding of the complications existing in the region and shed light on the differing national and regional perspectives on the CTBT. While most of the states in the region are members of the key non-proliferation treaties and agreements, contributing to their ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is a challenging but important task. In this regard, this research paper provides some practical recommendations to promote CTBT ratification in the region.

 

Introduction

The proliferation challenges in the Middle East are numerous, and represent a major security dilemma for regional states and the international community. From the ambiguity of Israel’s nuclear weapons capability to Iran’s nuclear threshold status, the risk of further regional nuclear proliferation remains a constant concern. The region is uniquely full of both non-proliferation successes and failures.

Nascent nuclear weapon development programmes in Iraq and Libya were dismantled, and most countries in the Middle East have joined the major non-proliferation and disarmament instruments, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Several countries are part of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa under the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the conference to discuss the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone (MEWMDFZ). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supports a number of regional states to develop civil nuclear technology, and most of the states have adopted the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (AP) – a strong guarantor of nuclear security and non-proliferation.

The regional proliferation failures are equally numerous: Iran’s nuclear programme has expanded far beyond the parameters of the crumbling Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Israeli nuclear programme is a source of serious regional discomfort, Syria has an unresolved nuclear proliferation legacy, and a number of states have yet to sign or ratify the CTBT, including three Annex 2 states which are necessary for the treaty to enter into force. As a reflection of the tense security landscape and proliferation risks, attacks on nuclear facilities, the assassination of nuclear scientists, proliferation of missiles, drones, dual-use technologies, and non-state actors all contribute to regional insecurity and conflict.

At a global level, the CTBT seeks to act as a stepping stone towards nuclear disarmament by acting as a reliable international tool to monitor any potential instance of nuclear weapon testing, and establishing a qualitative cap on nuclear weapon development. Today, eight Annex 2 countries are left to ratify the CTBT and enable the treaty to enter into force. Three are from the Middle East Egypt, Iran, and Israel. Though they supported the treaty by signing it, the political will and regional conditions to ratify it are absent. Today’s dynamic of political challenges in the Middle East is very different from two decades ago when the CTBT was opened for signature. Examples of significant developments in the previous two decades include conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the Arab Spring, the emergence of new terrorist groups, Iran’s expanded nuclear activities and proxy conflicts with Arab neighbours, stagnation of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, and normalisation between Israel and Arab states.

Ratification of the CTBT is further complicated and influenced by these developments, which at the same time also underline the importance of the treaty’s entry into force for the Middle East: the CTBT offers the region an unmatched opportunity to de-escalate tensions around the region-wide security challenge of nuclear proliferation, through supporting disarmament, strengthening confidence-building measures, mitigating the risk of conflict escalation, encouraging cooperation international partners, and promoting regional dialogue. The pathway to achieving a Middle East nuclear-test-free zone is long, and will require a robust regional effort and the participation of Annex 2 states, as well as Saudi Arabia and Syria. Understanding the distinct set of circumstances of each of the states in the region is critical to determining the prospects and supporting the entry into force of the CTBT.

 

Country Case Studies

Egypt

Although signing and ratifying the NPT was a sign of disinterest in having nuclear weapons, CTBT ratification requires additional efforts. A high-level political objective of Egypt for many years has been the establishment of a comprehensive legal regime in the Middle East that would prohibit the development and possession of weapons of mass destruction. Since the 1990s, Egypt, which is one of the Annex 2 countries, has refused to sign any nuclear-related treaties unless regional countries first accede to the main non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. Egypt has signed the BWC, yet it has not signed the CWC. The country has been an IAEA member state since 1957[1], and it has signed and ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement[2]. Egypt has a 1961 vintage 2 MWt Russian research reactor which is currently in shutdown, and a 22 MWt Argentinian research reactor (ETRR-2)[3].

Despite its acknowledgement of the importance of the CTBT, Egypt has not ratified the treaty yet, to draw attention to its strong position and diplomacy in achieving a MEWMDFZ. Years have passed by, and the country’s Foreign Ministry always expresses the same solid opinion. Nonetheless, Egypt supports the CTBT objectives, and was one of the first countries to sign the treaty in 1996. Under the CTBT, Egypt is planned to host two seismic stations - one primary in Luxor and one auxiliary in Kottamaya.[4]
 

On September 23, 2016, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the CTBT,[5]and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that it is unfair and unacceptable to put countries that have nuclear weapons on an equal footing with those that do not. He expressed that it would have been more relevant to prioritise nuclear disarmament and emphasize the importance of signatory countries and all state parties to promote and effectively engage in any discussion related to the treaty.[6]
 

After all, Israel ratifying the NPT would be a crucial key in Egypt’s CTBT ratification.  Furthermore, due to the fact that regional countries are considering nuclear energy, a regional forum could be formed to exchange nuclear data, experience, and joint papers to ensure their best intentions.

 

Iran

Iran is one of the three Middle Eastern Annex 2 states, which has signed but not ratified the CTBT. A series of interconnected issues, including tense relationships with regional countries, hostile rhetoric with the United States and imposed economic sanctions, impacts Iranian perception of necessary steps to take in the security field. That being said, Iran does not seem to consider the CTBT ratification as a top priority. At the same time, the Iranian authorities consistently express their support towards the CTBT objectives and principles but link the progress in the treaty’s entry into force with general progress in disarmament.

After Iran’s clandestine nuclear infrastructure was revealed in 2002, the country admitted to running a covert nuclear program for almost two decades. Iran ratified both the BWC and the CWC, and supported the NPT’s indefinite extension. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to adopting the IAEA AP but the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian deal postponed the implementation of an Additional Protocol.

Although Iran was one of the first countries to sign the CTBT, as of 2021 the Iranian Majles has not ratified the treaty. There are several reasons for Iran’s non-ratification, including Israeli nuclear ambiguity and Saudi non-signatory status of the CTBT. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council expressed concern regarding IMS stations on Iranian territory, which could be “a way for Western states to obtain Iranian military security data”.[7] Despite these fears, Iran’s activities could be tracked from monitoring stations in other countries, even if Iran does not ratify the CTBT. Thus, Iranian refusal to install monitoring stations would leave the country without access to global IMS data, while its military secrets would not be preserved.[8] Another negative factor blocking progress towards the CTBT ratification in Iran is its leadership’s indifference towards the treaty: Iranian authorities do not consider the CTBT ratification as an essential or significant element of the country’s security. So, the advantages of full-scale cooperation with the CTBTO should be constantly stressed out to Iranian authorities to encourage the country to ratify the treaty.

Under the CTBT, Iran is supposed to host five monitoring stations within its territory.[9] While some stations were constructed, they were shut down in 2002-2006 due to unclear reasons, and conditions for their reactivation are vague. As of December 2021, Iranian outstanding balance at the CTBTO is around 6,5 million dollars; 275,464  dollars for 2021.[10] So, Iran’s voting rights were suspended. The Iranian debt to the CTBTO could illustrate its indifference towards the participation in the CTBTO’s work. At the same time, imposed economic sanctions affect Iran’s ability to pay, and that factor should not be ruled out.

Iran would benefit from the CTBT, as it gives access to equipment that can be used for scientific purposes, and within the CTBTO, Iranian scientists would be able to exchange data on various verification techniques. Also, Iran would receive information from other countries’ monitoring stations. Although Iran will not move toward ratification of the CTBT  without progress on the JCPOA, as well as normalization of bilateral relationships with the United States and the Middle Eastern countries, the CTBT ratification could be presented as a voluntary step that “responsible nations pursue,”[11] and it would be a way “to assuage Western concerns and demonstrate its peaceful intentions.”[12] Iranian authorities have never publicly expressed discontent with the CTBT or its objectives - if goodwill and multilateral compromises, including on the JCPOA, are demonstrated, there could be hope for Iran’s ratification.

 

Israel

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the country has faced many complex security challenges. For a long time, the main threat was presented by a military coalition of Arab States, which aimed to destroy Israel using large-scale conventional military operations. However, considering the dynamics of the changing situation in the Middle East, new security challenges have arisen, primarily related to guerrilla warfare and terrorism, cyber threats, development of missile technology,[13][14] and efforts to achieve nuclear military capabilities. These changes are reflected in Israel's security strategy and perception of contemporary threats. Thus, the main security challenges shifted to unconventional methods of warfare and possible nuclear threat.

In order to counter possible threats and acquire a military advantage, in the 1950s the Israeli government initiated developing a nuclear program, which nowadays is the mainstay of the military doctrine and consists of two main pillars, namely the direct development and possession of nuclear weapons, as well as the use of any methods to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons between other states in the Middle East.[15]

Considering “non-signatory” status of the NPT but membership at the IAEA, Israel is one of three states in which the Agency applies item-specific safeguards agreement INFCIRC/66/Rev.2[16][17] Israel has neither signed the BWC nor ratified the CWC. In this case, it is worth noting that Israel’s position is influenced by the position of Egypt, which hasn’t signed the CWC, and the breaches of the treaty by Syria, despite being a CWC state party.[18][19][20] The interconnected status of the various non-proliferation and disarmament mechanisms in the region further complicates the prospects for CTBT ratification. Israel signed the CTBT on September 25, 1996, but still has not ratified it. Israel hosts two auxiliary seismic stations and one radionuclide laboratory.[21] In June 2016, Lassina Zerbo, former CTBTO Executive Secretary, met with the Israeli Prime Minister to discuss prospects for Israeli ratification. While Prime Minister Netanyahu underlined Israel’s support for the treaty, he emphasised that it was dependent on the regional context, and a matter of appropriate timing.[22]

Taking into account such factors that Israel cannot count on direct military support in the case of a national threat, and also that formal dialogue between Israel and some Middle Eastern countries is impossible due to the lack of diplomatic relations, the most realistic way out of this situation is cooperation with international organizations and institutions. Cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology, and joint environmental initiatives may be quite promising.  Today, changes in Israeli domestic and foreign policy are noticeable. The new country’s leadership is actively showing its desire and readiness for dialogue[23]. Perhaps this is the right time for CTBT to organize a new visit to Israel and remind of the benefits of international cooperation.

 

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s non-accession to the CTBT is a matter of current regional political conditions. Iran’s progress in nuclear technology and its potential to develop nuclear weapons are among Saudi top regional security concerns. For Saudi Arabia, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would mean a radical shift in the balance of power, especially around the Gulf. Such development would exacerbate regional tensions, make concessions in the nuclear security field practically impossible, and lead to an inevitable nuclear arms race.  Therefore, the Saudi decision to sign the CTBT relies principally on the regional nuclear security domain's status, considering two main factors. First, a JCPOA+ that goes beyond the current JCPOA and involves the issue of Iran’s missile program,  nuclear activities, and regional behaviours.[24] The second factor is Israel's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

Saudi Arabia is a state party to the major non-proliferation agreements, including the NPT, BWC, and CWC. The Saudi government has ambitious plans to develop nuclear reactors for peaceful uses to meet the growing energy demand. Saudi Arabia has multiple nuclear cooperation agreements with different countries, and it is an IAEA member state with a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) in force. However, the IAEA underlines the necessity to rescind the SQP and conclude an Additional Protocol.[25]

Saudi Arabia is a proponent of establishing a MEWMDFZ.[26] By scrutinizing Saudi Arabia’s international stance towards nuclear proliferation, it is clear that the country supports the CTBT’s primary objective, but the regional political situation prevents it from joining. Under the CTBT, Saudi Arabia hosts two seismic stations but the facility agreement is yet to be concluded.[27] Saudi Arabia attended the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held in 1999 in Vienna as an observer.[28]  The lack of U.S. ratification due to the Senate vote, India and Pakistan nuclear ambition, and the low number of attendees, 92 out of 154[29], created a tense atmosphere of the conference and the treaty's future.  These factors may have led to giving the treaty secondary importance to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it didn't participate in subsequent meetings, as the existing documents indicate, not to mention that it was not part of the negotiations of Annex 2 list.

Today, Saudi Arabia has the necessary resources to lead regional initiatives. By promoting the CTBT regionally, Saudi could benefit politically from dispelling all accusations about the nature of its nuclear program, and scientifically by the data it would receive from the CTBTO for its scientific institutions. Saudi Arabia can leverage international platforms such as the 2022 NPT or similar conferences to promote accession to the CTBT while highlighting the treaty's significance in advancing the region's security, peace, and stability. Due to its regional influence, Saudi ratification of the CTBT may enhance regional confidence-building measures, improve bilateral relations between rivals at a time of growing friction, and influence the decisions of the remaining Annex 2 countries and Syria to consider advancing the CTBT regionally.

 

Syria

Syria is one of only two States in the Middle East which has not signed the CTBT, although it is not an Annex 2 State. As a country, Syria faces enormous challenges, largely caused by the ongoing conflict which has lasted for more than a decade. The complexity of the crisis means that Syria is unlikely to be in a position to consider ratification of the CTBT in the near-future, at least until there is a decisive end to the conflict. Even then, the priority will be on reconstruction and reconciliation efforts, and restoring relations with States in the region—only then could ratification of the CTBT even be considered.

Syria has a dubious proliferation record, with high profile cases of chemical weapons use against civilians in the Syrian conflict, despite Syria’s ratification of the CWC in 2013. Syria has also not ratified the BWC, which it signed in 1972. Syria has been a State Party to the NPT since 1969. On nuclear safeguards, the IAEA suspended verification activities since 2013 due to the ongoing conflict. Syria does not implement the Additional Protocol, and the Agency has serious unresolved concerns about the country’s past nuclear activities. In 2007, the Israeli air force destroyed a suspected nuclear reactor at the Al-Kibar site, supposedly to be used for production of plutonium.[30] IAEA inspectors were only allowed access to the site in 2008 after pre-existing structures had been demolished, and in 2011 the Agency released a report stating that it was “very likely” that the facility had been a nuclear reactor.[31]

At the UN General Assembly vote on the CTBT in 1996, Syria was one of a handful of countries which abstained, criticising the treaty for its perceived inability to effectively bring about disarmament in nuclear weapon states, and the lack of guarantees against the threat of use of nuclear weapons.[32] Syria also cited Israel’s nuclear programme as a clear obstacle to disarmament in the region, including for the establishment of a MEWMDFZ.

Nevertheless, given Syria’s position in the region, and its proliferation legacy, Syrian ratification of the CTBT is an essential step in achieving region-wide adoption of the treaty. Even if Syria’s ratification is tied to geopolitics in the region, signing the treaty would be a positive interim step which Syria could pursue without preconditions, as a confidence-building measure between Syria, neighbouring countries, and the international community.

 

Table 1. Key Non-proliferation Treaties Status in the Middle East
Country	NPT	CWC	BWC	CTBT
Egypt	Ratified 1968	Not signed	Signed 1972	Signed October 14, 1996
Iran	Ratified 1968	Ratified 1973	Ratified 1973	Signed September 24, 1996
Israel	Not signed	Signed 1993	Not signed	Signed September 25, 1996
Saudi Arabia	Acceded 1988	Ratified 1996	Ratified 1972	Not signed
Syria	Ratified 1968	Acceded 2013	Signed 1972	Not signed

Recommendations

With an understanding of the domestic and regional conditions which influence CTBT dynamics in the Middle East, there are a wide range of potential steps to strengthen engagement with the CTBT and its objectives. While CTBT ratification by the remaining regional countries faces several challenges, constructive efforts can be made under three broad categories, namely Awareness and Advocacy, Cooperation and Capacity-Building, and Policy and Promotion.

 

Awareness and Advocacy

A key component of any non-proliferation and disarmament mechanism is the presence of a robust civil society dialogue, something which is largely absent in the Middle East. While nuclear proliferation risks are a concern for several states in the region, to date there has been limited discussion of the CTBT’s capacity to further non-proliferation in the region. States can work with international partners to invest in and facilitate civil society discussion, both at national and regional levels. Even if there is currently limited political appetite to consider CTBT ratification or signature, a robust Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogue can create a solid foundation of knowledge and awareness of the CTBT and associated issues which can help formal Track I dialogue and negotiations when political conditions are optimal.

The broader engagement of people from diverse backgrounds in the region is also a key catalyst for the CTBT’s success in the Middle East. While arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament discussions have traditionally been the exclusive purview of small groups of diplomats, military officers, and policymakers, a greater societal dialogue should be developed. Nuclear testing is something which affects everyone, and involving young people, indigenous populations, women, and scientific and technical experts in the discussion is an important step in understanding the challenges for, and benefits of, the CTBT from a diverse range of perspectives.

In this regard, organisations such as the CTBTO Youth Group (CYG) offer young people the platform to engage with the topic of nuclear testing — something they may never have learned about or considered in the regional context. The CYG has a small but growing group of members from the Middle East who will be essential pioneers in their societies for raising awareness about nuclear testing. The CTBTO and Youth Group could support such efforts in the region by helping local members to create regional CYG chapters at universities, which would engage more members, and create a relatable awareness of the CTBT in the context of the Middle East.

The CTBTO’s YPN is another organisation aimed at creating a global community of young scientists and technical professionals working on areas related to the CTBTO’s IMS. Membership of the YPN should be more widely publicised in the Middle East, and could offer affiliate membership to people from non-ratifying or non-signatory states to enhance regional networking, and to raise the profile of the scientific applications of the CTBT in the region. The Middle East Next Generation of Arms Control Specialists (MENACS) Network is another example of involving young research and policy professionals in networking and discussions related to regional security and non-proliferation, including the CTBT.

Of particular importance to engagement efforts should be the translation of official documents related to the CTBT, digital communication campaigns, and research reports into the major languages of the Middle East, particularly Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian. Multilingualism can greatly extend the reach of the CTBTO’s message and objectives far beyond a limited group of English-speakers in the region, and will be essential to generating domestic discussions in the Annex 2 states in particular. Social media and digital communication have been critical to the success of any social or political movement in the region. In this regard, the CTBTO and partner organisations can create region-specific digital campaigns to educate the local population in the CTBT related issues and to raise awareness of the risks of nuclear testing.

 

Cooperation and Capacity-Building

Enhancing scientific and technical cooperation in the region is another important area the CTBT could facilitate. There is a growing interest in the applications of nuclear technologies in the Middle East, from using nuclear power to move away from fossil fuels and combat climate change, to developing nuclear isotopes for use in medicine, and sterilisation of pests to reduce disease and boost agricultural output. The CTBTO can take advantage of this interest to advertise its capacity to ensure that nuclear technology is used only for peaceful purposes.

While the primary role of the IMS is the detection of nuclear testing, the earth sciences data compiled in the IDC, collected from an unparalleled global network of sensors, is a remarkable scientific and technical asset to any country. In the past, the IMS’s data has been used to predict tsunamis and earthquakes, estimate the impact, and prepare the appropriate emergency response to such incidents. The CTBTO should also develop closer partnerships with the IAEA, and organise regional scientific and technical forums and conferences, to include the scientific applications of the CTBTO’s IMS data. On a similar note, the IAEA, in cooperation with international partners such as the UN or P5, could host a regional Nuclear Security Forum, part of which could highlight the CTBT as a vital tool to ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in the region.

Cooperation through joint educational initiatives is another opportunity for regional states to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East. Joint degree programmes in nuclear sciences and non-proliferation would allow students to study in different countries in the region to understand the distinct perceptions and challenges related to non-proliferation and disarmament, including the CTBT. For degree programmes in nuclear engineering or science, the CTBTO could invite students from the region to Vienna for a tour of the CTBTO’s facilities, with talks from technical experts.

The CTBTO could also offer to host visiting fellows with technical or scientific backgrounds from regional states, including Annex 2 countries. Visiting fellows could contribute to the work of the CTBTO technical staff through their own research projects, while gaining exposure and understanding of how the CTBTO operates. The CTBTO has a long-running internship programme, but could ensure that specific internship positions are reserved for young people from Annex 2 and other non-ratifying states in the region.

The creation of a dedicated regional task team in the CTBTO would help to strengthen the organisation’s efforts to develop targeted scientific, technical, and political engagement and gain a better understanding of the political sensitivities associated with the Treaty in the Middle East. In support of these efforts, states could agree to increase their contributions to the CTBTO’s annual budget.

 

Policy and Promotion

While civil society and educational efforts are important to enhance the CTBT’s prospects in the region, ultimately this is a decision to be taken at a political level. To initiate a high-level dialogue on the role of the CTBT in the region, the CTBTO should seek to develop cooperation with important regional organisations such as the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As part of a campaign to increase political engagement in the region, the CTBTO’s Executive Secretary Dr. Rob Floyd could make a trip to the Middle East to meet with officials and indicate his commitment to better understanding the challenges facing the CTBT.

Actions also could be taken through the Article XIV conferences, where the CTBTO could invite participation from non-ratifying and non-signatory states as observers, allowing states to engage with the process without requiring a binding political commitment. On the same note, states which have yet to join the treaty could offer to host IMS stations on an ad-hoc basis, allowing the CTBTO and the international community to benefit from the data collected. An example of this is Israel, which hosts two IMS stations and a radionuclide laboratory — other states in the region could be invited to do the same. The CTBTO should engage with states such as Iran, which are concerned about the data collected on their territory, and reassure them of the integrity and usage of that data. Thus, even if there is no political will or conditions to join the CTBT at this time, states in the region can still take positive steps towards strengthening the treaty and non-proliferation regime in general.  

Moreover, CTBT entry into force would be an undoubtable victory for the NPT regime more widely; therefore, there is room for initiatives from the CTBTO side on the sidelines of NPT Review Conferences. For instance, the CTBTO could partner with the EU or P5 to host a side event on the role of the CTBT, including its implementation in the Middle East. The UN’s annual conference on establishing a MEWMDFZ would be another platform through which the CTBTO could demonstrate its importance to the region. Even though not all regional states have participated in or endorsed the aims of this conference, in any future MEWMDFZ the CTBT would likely be a key component as part of a broader regional monitoring and non-proliferation structure. The CTBTO could also explore the role of the CTBT in other established nuclear weapon-free zones around the world, creating lessons learned and best practices for the Middle East.

Another way to raise the profile of the CTBT at a political level would be to have a high-level non-binding political declaration on the negative impact of nuclear testing from governments or former officials. While achieving such a statement from all countries in the region could be challenging, it would be a positive step to build a solid basis for future political consultations on the CTBT. On the non-governmental side, religious leaders play a major role in the region, and their endorsement would be viewed through the lens of an apolitical moral obligation to protect society from the harmful effects of nuclear tests. There are already some existing precedents in the form of Iran’s fatwa against nuclear weapons. An official condemnation of nuclear testing by the religious leaders of the Middle East would have a powerful effect, and would bring the message of the CTBT to many people who may never even have heard of the CTBT, or know about the legacy of nuclear tests.

The nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility to promote the CTBT in the region. France in particular could take a lead role in this effort, given the history of French nuclear testing in Algeria. The P5 should make greater efforts to address their nuclear testing legacy, especially in cases where indigenous communities suffered negative consequences without adequate support or compensation from the authorities. While the impetus to ratify the CTBT in the Middle East must come from the states of the region, the P5 needs to set a good example in this regard. US and China’s ratification would further bolster efforts to secure a nuclear testing-free zone in the Middle East.  

 

 

Table 2. Recommendations to promote CTBT ratification in the Middle East
Awareness and Advocacy
Short-term (up to 5 years)	Initiate Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogue on CTBT issues. Translation of official documents related to the CTBT, digital communications campaigns, and research reports into the major languages of the Middle East.  Increase involvement and engagement from young research, technical, and policy professionals from the Middle East, through organisations such as the CYG, CTBTO YPN, and MENACS.
Medium-term (5-15 years)	Sustain discussions through Track 2 and Track 1.5, and facilitate Track 1 dialogue. Create region-specific digital campaigns to educate people about the risks of nuclear testing, and the important role played by the CTBT.
Long-term (15 years +)	Combination of all three Tracks - 1, 1.5, and 2. For the CTBTO and regional states: to keep mechanisms established under Short- and Medium-term goals working.
Cooperation and Capacity-Building
Short-term (up to 5 years)	Enhance cooperation between the CTBTO and the IAEA through a Cooperation Agreement, to promote the CTBT as a vital tool to ensure nuclear non-proliferation in the region as more states adopt nuclear technologies. Creation of visiting fellowship opportunities for early-mid career professionals from the region to participate in the CTBTO’s work.
Medium-term (5-15 years)	The CTBTO, in cooperation with the IAEA, should organise regional scientific and technical forums and conferences, to highlight the scientific applications of the CTBTO’s IMS data. Establishment of dual degree programmes between the states of the region, focusing on nuclear technology and non-proliferation. Create a dedicated regional task force in the CTBTO to lead on scientific, technical, and political engagement in the Middle East.
Long-term (15 years +)	For the CTBTO, IAEA, regional states and international facilitators: to keep mechanisms established under Short- and Medium-term goals working.
Policy and Promotion
Short-term (up to 5 years)	The CTBTO’s Executive Secretary should make a trip to the Middle East to promote high-level engagement with the Treaty. The CTBTO should facilitate the participation of non-ratifying and non-signatory states in the Article XIV conferences as observers. The EU or P5 could host a side event on the role and importance of the CTBT at future NPT Review Conferences. Host a side event at the UN’s annual conference on establishing a MEWMDFZ to underline the role of the CTBT in other established NWFZs around the world, and create lessons learned and best practices for the Middle East. The states of the region could make high-level non-binding political declarations on harmful effects of nuclear testing, and to maintain the regional moratorium on nuclear testing. Religious leaders in the Middle East could publicly condemn nuclear testing, and spread the message of the CTBT to a larger audience.
Medium-term (5-15 years)	The CTBTO should conclude Cooperation Agreements with the LAS, OIC, and GCC to focus its work in the region through established organisations. Non-ratifying or non-signatory states could agree to host IMS stations on an ad-hoc basis. The P5 should work to substantively address their legacy of nuclear testing, ensuring adequate support for affected communities. With its history nuclear testing in the Middle East, France should lead in this regard.
Long-term (15 years +)	For the CTBTO and regional states: to keep mechanisms established under Short- and Medium-term goals working. Ratification of the CTBT by remaining Annex Two States, and the US and China in particular.

Conclusion

Although the obstacles for a region-wide endorsement of the CTBT are numerous, and the conditions for a formal political process may take many years to materialise, the CTBT needs to be recognised as an indispensable component of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the Middle East. While current political conditions are far from optimal, there are a range of positive steps that the states of the region and the international community could take to strengthen the position of the CTBT. Low-hanging fruits such as creating educational opportunities and raising awareness of nuclear testing are realistic goals which can be implemented in the short-term. Making the messages of the CTBT more accessible through engagement with traditionally under-represented communities and providing a region-specific context and focus are applicable to not just the Middle East, but also to other regions with non-ratifying states.

With a solid foundation of support and engagement, in the medium-term states can develop concrete mechanisms for collaboration on the scientific and technical applications of nuclear technologies to address the pressing challenges facing the region. The CTBTO can support these efforts by engaging with communities of technical experts and offering relevant educational and professional development opportunities. In the long-term, a political level endorsement of the CTBT can only be possible through structured gradual coordination between the CTBTO and the region. In this regard, the international community has a vital role to play in stimulating and promoting political engagement, in part by living up to their obligations under the CTBT and other international non-proliferation and disarmament mechanisms.

Even if a Middle East nuclear test-free zone proves impossible to achieve in the long-term, the process of engagement between the states of the region and international actors could be a beneficial step in generating a genuine dialogue on security challenges and perceptions among the different states. The CTBT and its monitoring regime will not resolve the complex security, non-proliferation, and disarmament challenges in the region. Rather, the CTBT is part of a larger framework of interlinked and mutually reinforcing mechanisms to promote transparency, accountability, and inalienable security for the region as a whole.