Roundtable Pak-India Engagement on CTBT: Challenges and Opportunities

Aparna Joshi, Pranav R. Satyanath, Rizwan Asghar and Sufian Ullah

 

Over the past two and a half decades, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has emerged as a crucial pillar of global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regimes. However, despite many efforts to outlaw testing of nuclear weapons, the treaty remains in a state of limbo. A deadlock exists because Article XIV of the CTBT makes the ratification by 44 states with commercial or research nuclear reactors necessary for the treaty to become legally binding. Of those specified states, the US, China, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, India, Iran, and Egypt have not yet ratified the treaty. Focusing on Pakistan and India, this paper seeks to identify the challenges and opportunities for cooperation between both countries on CTBT related issues. The rationale behind this proposal is that entry into force of the CTBT shall directly contribute to global peace and security. Erecting a more substantial legal barrier against the resumption of nuclear testing in South Asia will lead to a more stable environment in the region.

Building on their assessment of prevailing challenges and existing knowledge of cooperation between two countries, two Pakistani and two Indian experts share their points of view on the following questions:

• What are the preferable goals for India and Pakistan’s engagement on the CTBT?
• What are the potential formats for such an engagement?
• What to expect from this dialogue in the mid-term and long term regarding the agreed positions, measures, political decisions?

 

What are the preferable goals for India and Pakistan’s engagement on the CTBT?

Aparna Joshi

To put it briefly, India and Pakistan aim for the step by step, and voluntary disarmament process, one that ensures on. Peacebuilding and confidence-building measures are to be integrated into the very process of being adopted between the two nations.

Pranav R. Satyanath

The biggest challenge that both states face is deciding the scope of cooperation and the preferable goals of such cooperation in the context of a test ban. Wishing both states to sign the CTBT or agree to some mechanisms within the Treaty’s framework is impractical as India continues to reject the CTBT [1] and Pakistan’s refusal to sign the treaty falls squarely on India’s decision to do the same.[2]

Hoping for comprehensive bilateral nuclear agreement between the two states is also not viable, as cooperation on nuclear and risk-reduction measures in recent years has come to a near standstill in recent years. It is not the case that India and Pakistan are disinterested in reducing risks. Rather, the confidence-building and risk-reduction measures (CBRMs) are overshadowed by non-nuclear and geopolitical concerns through the politics of linkages. Both sides have used linkages as a tool to either bargain or thwart negotiations on nuclear issues. Indian representatives, for example, urge that any talks on CBRMs must be preceded by talks on cross-border terrorism that originate from Pakistan’s soil. Indeed, some scholars have raised the possibility that India’s case for escalation might stem from a major cross-border terrorist attack originating from Pakistan, such that it crosses India’s tolerance threshold.[3]

On Pakistan’s side, the concerns are over supposed conventional asymmetry and India’s ability to use conventionally superior forces to seize disputed territory.[4] More importantly, Pakistan views Kashmir as integral to its conception of national identity.[5] Therefore, the negotiation of CBRMs for Pakistan hinges on resolving the long-drawn Kashmir issue with India. Indeed, the commitment to resolve the Kashmir border dispute and solve cross-border terrorism was mutually agreed upon by India and Pakistan in 1999 in the Lahore Declaration.[6]

While these issues are indeed important and hold value in reducing escalation risks between the two states, they often act as an impediment to negotiating confidence-building measures and scientific cooperation that lie at the peripherals of controlling escalatory behaviours. India and Pakistan must therefore set more modest goals for the short and medium-term.

One such short-term goal could be the negotiation of an agreement to exchange seismic data from the nuclear test sites of each other’s territories. The expected outcome of such an arrangement is to better understand each side’s concerns over nuclear testing, create greater levels of transparency, and foster scientific cooperation between the two countries on nuclear matters.[7] A bilateral data-exchange agreement could also act as a steppingstone to negotiate a more comprehensive regional or bilateral test ban treaty.

Negotiating such a bilateral agreement could also help avoid some of the linkages that have hindered more complex forms of cooperation in the past. Further, such ‘soft’ arms control treaties might be more politically viable as they do not bind either state into making changes to their force posture or make costly political bargains that would block domestic support.[8]

Rizwan Asghar

From Pakistan’s perspective, the fact that the CTBT has yet to enter into force allows for the possibility that New Delhi may choose to resume nuclear testing without many consequences. The logical consequence of this possibility is that Pakistan should prefer a complete ban on nuclear testing through ratification of the CTBT to any perceived security benefits it may gain from choosing not to ratify the Treaty. Similar arguments could be made from India’s perspective.

Therefore, I argue that efforts to advance the entry into force of the CTBT serve both countries’ security interests by increasing strategic stability and improving prospects for arms control. Finding the political will to make this cooperation possible between two countries is the key and is, thus, the main focus of this paper.

Sufian Ullah

Banning nuclear tests is considered a crucial step to pursue comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Despite the decades-long focus on this aspect, it remains the hardest fought item on the disarmament agenda. The idealists and realist schools of thought have differently analyzed the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of different states. While the idealists consider nuclear deterrence a cause of an unending arms race, realists see it as a lynchpin of deterrence to ensure stability between strategic adversaries.[9] Hence, despite declared commitments to pursue disarmament, the two camps continuously fail to reach a mutually agreeable mechanism to achieve this endeavour.

The key reason behind the ongoing impasse on entry-into-force of the CTBT is the underlying confidence of nuclear-armed states in the deterrence power of nuclear weapons, which is a guarantee against possible nuclear weapons use. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) has ensured military stalemate among adversaries by generating a fear that nuclear war shall be equivalent to mutual suicide.[10] This is evident from the South Asian strategic situation where the two adversaries have mutually recognized nuclear deterrence as a factor of stability, making the situation more prone to deterring force modernization instead of pursuing disarmament.[11] Both Pakistan and India have declared unilateral moratoria but are not part of any legally binding mechanism to ban nuclear testing. The preferable goal of engagement between the two states should be to resolve outstanding disputes and identify the threats posed to strategic stability in the region.

 

What are the potential formats for such an engagement?

Aparna Joshi

The format of engagement with the CTBT as discussed by participants prior to me should be at a variety of levels, moreover, it should be gradual process beginning with the level of research and analysis, followed by tactical engagement at the level of military and then lastly, at a political level, this could  be through a series of binding bilateral treaties or a single bilateral accord that is mutually binding in nature.

Pranav R. Satyanath

The format for CTBT engagement in South Asia can be discussed at two levels. First, the engagement between India and Pakistan itself, which takes precedence. And second, India and Pakistan’s engagement with third countries. I provide my recommendations for both these situations below.

Keeping up with the theme of modest diplomacy, India and Pakistan must initiate discussions at the semi-official level, namely, a Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogue. Such a format will not only allow a more open exchange of views, but it may also provide younger professionals to interact and exchange ideas. Based on the tone of these discussions, both India and Pakistan must take every initiative to move to formal negotiations at the Foreign Secretary-level and establish relevant working groups to work out the details of a seismic data-exchange agreement.

Concerning engagement with third countries, India and Pakistan could welcome third countries such as the United States, China and Russia as observer states.[12] Further, inviting Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the non-nuclear-weapon states in the region as observer states, would also signal India and Pakistan’s sincerity in negotiating a bilateral test ban-related agreement. Involving third parties in formal negotiations would only complicate matters, as both India and Pakistan are not a party to the NPT, and formally engaging with nuclear-weapon states (NWS) could raise questions about the legal status of India and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. Hence, a bilateral negotiation format with third parties present as observers would best serve the purposes of the two South Asian states.

Sufian Ullah

It is important to engage and resume meaningful and comprehensive dialogue for resolution of ongoing disputes in South Asia. Given the political tensions between Pakistan and India, the CTBT-related engagement can be useful. However, any discussion on exploring the prospects of cooperation merit an assessment of prevailing challenges. A set of factors that hinder prospects of engagement between Pakistan and India on CTBT include possible resumption of thermonuclear tests by India, New Delhi’s evolving strategic posture that follows aggressive trajectory, and discriminatory approaches at global level that give India access to nuclear market. The exceptional Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver granted to India signified that the U.S. preferred geopolitical considerations, particularly countering China, over broader non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, which directly undermined the rule-based non-proliferation regime.[13] Ashley J. Tellis, who is well known for his lead role in Washington’s nuclear policy towards New Delhi, advised integrating India into non-proliferation regime order without asking it to cap the size of its nuclear forces. Hence, the exceptional waiver allowed New Delhi to reap benefits of NPT states, like securing international assistance for its civilian nuclear reactors, without signing the CTBT, committing to freezing production of weapons-grade fissile material and legally committing to pursue disarmament. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared in the parliament in 2006 that India would retain its right to conduct nuclear tests in future.[14] Conversely, the deal allows India to achieve domestic energy independence and produce larger quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons production.

It signifies NSG members states’ little interest in urging India to legally commit to disarmament measures, sign the CTBT, or keep it away from conducting a thermonuclear weapon test. These concerns directly shape Islamabad’s threat perception and consequently undermine the prospects of engagement on CTBT. Thus, despite broad international support to the Treaty, its future in South Asia remains bleak because of the factors discussed above.

Rizwan Asghar

I argue that one of the most effective means of ensuring that both India and Pakistan ratify the CTBT is the formation of public opinion in both countries rallied around the idea that a complete ban on nuclear testing serves both countries’ strategic interests. More lavish public attention on this issue will yield answers that make substantial progress on this issue impossible.

The logic underlying my argument is that making the public more aware of the dangers associated with a world without a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing will help us counter certain domestic institutional biases in both countries in favour of this ban. This is consistent with lessons that emerge from the record of past fifty years of efforts for arms control that domestic political factor have often been a greater hindrance than genuine security interests of states.

Since the public in both countries has largely remained uninterested in foreign policy and security issues, this has allowed more space for their governments to adopt policies that may not necessarily serve national interests. By creating public opinion in favour of the ratification of the CTBT, that space can be taken back.

 

What to expect from this dialogue in the mid-term and long term regarding the agreed positions, measures, political decisions?

Aparna Joshi

To find a long-lasting solution to the issue of the CTBT, it is crucial to take a systematic approach towards the signing of the CTBT at several levels, separate domestic conflicts and geopolitical points away from the acceptance and universality of the CTBT.

To sign the CTBT, India would need to be assured non-aggression from its neighbouring territories. To achieve this goal, if the Indian and Pakistani governments were to take up a multi-tiered approach, the conflicts would be resolved with significant ease. The two governments would initially require grass-root level coordination and de-escalation in rhetoric towards each other.

The second step would be at the national level to involve the major stakeholders within the regions under nuclear threat and areas of nuclear power production. These stakeholders would be members of the local governance structures, who would be aware of nuclear war's potential cost and risk.

Thirdly, both India and Pakistan should involve nuclear scientists alongside diplomats and nuclear non-proliferation experts to inform the discussions from a scientific and technological point of view.

Fourthly, two armed forces members could be involved on a rotational basis to reduce the tactical threats and assess the potential flashpoints.

Lastly, two non-partial observer states are chosen, outside the P5 members of the UN, reflecting a new power dynamic and reducing the risk of influence by vested interests. These observers would hold office for one year, on the recommendation of the governing body of the non-proliferation board. Though the role of major international powers such as the USA and China cannot be overruled in the region, it is essential to note that the regional dynamics with the region as well as the role of vested interests of major powers may lead to a potential stalemate, rather than an effective resolution to the interaction on the subject of the CTBT or other non-proliferation measures.

Pranav R. Satyanath

The most important long-term goal for India and Pakistan must be to prevent the resumption of nuclear testing in South Asia. Irrespective of whether the two states become party to the CTBT, it is paramount that the two countries uphold the global norm against nuclear testing.

The second long-term goal for the two countries, as I mentioned earlier, would be to strive for a mutually verifiable bilateral test ban agreement. Such an arrangement, for example, could involve India and Pakistan agreeing to install seismic monitoring stations inside each other’s territories, with some provisions for on-site inspections.

Indeed, such an arrangement is less preferable than full assertion to the CTBT. However, a bilateral test ban agreement would allow India and Pakistan to adhere to the principle and spirit of the CTBT, even while avoiding some politically costly bargains. One could foresee a scenario where India and Pakistan could sign and ratify the CTBT if China and the United States complete their ratification process.[15] But this is unlikely to take place any soon.

Rizwan Asghar

The medium to long term goals should aim at more well-informed public opinion and involvement in both countries in favour of the CTBT. Both electronic and print media can play a critical role in this direction. Once public is more actively involved as a result of increased awareness of the benefits of the CTBT, it will be harder for the governments to hold back from ratifying the treaty because of their strategic myopia.

Sufian Ullah

Islamabad’s consistent policy approach and continued support to CTBT hint at the possibility of engagement on nuclear non-testing between Pakistan and India.

Islamabad’s proposals to New Delhi about simultaneous adherence to CTBT and converting unilateral moratorium into a bilateral agreement offer avenues of bilateral cooperation between the two nuclear adversaries. Hence, a verifiable, legally binding bilateral and region-oriented approach may gradually lead towards the desired objective. In 2001, General Parvez Musharaf, then President of Pakistan, remarked that “we are ready to formalize a bilateral treaty with India for a mutual test ban”.[16] Likewise, in 2016, Islamabad reiterated this proposal to consider a bilateral agreement to refrain from nuclear testing that signifies positive intent towards promoting restraint in South Asia. However, New Delhi’s non-willingness to sign CTBT or enter into a bilateral arrangement on non-testing with Pakistan directly affects Islamabad’s policy choices because of perceived security threats from its eastern neighbour. Pakistan consistently maintains that it shall not be the first to resume nuclear testing in South Asia.[17] Given the regional security environment in South Asia, Islamabad’s position on CTBT remains dependent on evolving nuclear posture of India.

In South Asia, the prospects of bilateral engagement remain limited due to prevailing strategic instability and India’s unwillingness to engage in bilateral arms control measures with Pakistan. Progress on CTBT may be pursued by raising mutual trust between the two nuclear rivals, addressing the unresolved disputes, and building regional strategic stability. The future prospects of universalization of CTBT and its success in South Asia are also directly linked to major powers’ policy decisions and approaches towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Besides major powers’ own failure to fulfil their obligations to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament under Article-VI of the NPT, the future of CTBT is also shaped by preferring narrow geopolitical interests compared to broader non-proliferation objectives.

Although arms control has struggled to establish a strong foothold in South Asia because of India’s unwillingness to engage with Pakistan bilaterally, the two states have cooperated on certain confidence-building measures (CBMs) to reduce the risks of nuclear warfare. Few of the bilateral nuclear risk reduction measures between Pakistan and India include the following:[18]

• Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (1988)
• Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles (2005)
• Agreement on Reducing the Risks from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons (2007)
• Hotline between Foreign Secretaries to Avoid the Cyber Attacks and Nuclear Risks (2004)

Although the scope of these agreements remains limited, they signify the intent on both sides to reduce the dangers of a possible nuclear exchange. The two states declare unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, which are not legally binding and could be withdrawn unilaterally. Given the prevailing mutual mistrust and their divergent strategic aspirations, the prospects of Pakistan and India’s adherence to CTBT remain bleak.

 

Conclusion

In South Asia, the prospects of bilateral engagement remain limited due to prevailing strategic instability and India’s unwillingness to engage in bilateral arms control measures with Pakistan. Progress on CTBT may be pursued by raising mutual trust between the two nuclear rivals, addressing the unresolved disputes, and building regional strategic stability. The prospects of universalization of CTBT and its success in South Asia are also directly linked to major powers’ policy decisions and approaches towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Besides major powers’ own failure to fulfil their obligations to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament under Article-VI of the NPT, the future of CTBT is also shaped by preferring narrow geopolitical interests compared to broader non-proliferation objectives.